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Abstract— There is a reduction in the percentage penetration 
of synchronous machines within the Great Britain (GB) power 
system leading to a decrease in inertia, and an increase in system 
rate of change of frequency (RoCoF) resulting from power 
imbalances. This raises the challenge of containing frequency 
deviations to within the relevant operational limits. As a result, 
steps need to be taken by the system operator to manage the risk 
to system security. In order to better understand this risk, this 
paper presents the challenge in light of the changing energy 
landscape and the current and future frequency response services 
available to contain frequency deviations. Although the current 
GB frequency response services may be capable of containing 
most events within frequency limits, in low inertia scenarios these 
responses alone are not capable of containing excursions within 
practical RoCoF limits. Consequently, further action must be 
taken to ensure system security. The system operator currently 
employs an interim solution of limiting the largest loss risk, 
depending on system inertia and the RoCoF limit. While this is 
suitable in the short-term, it is unlikely that this option will be 
cost-effective in the future.    
 
Index Terms— frequency response; frequency containment; 
loss risk; low inertia; RoCoF 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ustainability targets have led to the increased proliferation 
of low carbon, particularly renewable, generation. In Great 
Britain (GB), as in many countries, the two major renewable 
sources that have grown in recent years are wind and solar 
power, which are (in their majority) converter-connected, non-
synchronous, technologies. Their percentage share of 
generation is expected to continue to grow [1], while coal 
plants are expected to close [2, 3] and nuclear generation has 
an uncertain future.  
The increasing penetration of non-synchronous technologies 
in the power system presents challenges [4]. Traditionally, 
transmission connected synchronous machines have been the 
main sources of reserves of energy, delivered at different 
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timescales via inertia response, frequency containment reserve 
and restoration reserve. Inertia response is the instantaneous 
and automatic delivery of kinetic energy from synchronously 
connected plant rotors, via an inherent electromagnetic 
coupling with the network that opposes and helps correct 
imbalances in generation and demand. Non-synchronous 
generation technologies are so-called as they are connected via 
a solid-state electronic converter and do not have the same 
inherent capability of providing inertia to the system [5, 6]. 
The inertia of a power system affects the rate of change of 
frequency (RoCoF) following a system event [6, 7]. As system 
inertia reduces, the RoCoF increases for a given power 
imbalance which in turn, without remedial actions, reduces the 
system’s resilience to frequency disturbances [8, 9]. 
RoCoF relays are widely used in some countries, including 
the UK and Ireland, in loss of mains (LoM) protection for 
distributed generation [10, 11]. These relays are designed to 
disconnect generation when the locally measured RoCoF 
exceeds a given limit for a given period of time, taken to be an 
indicator of disconnection from the main interconnected 
system [12]. If the RoCoF following a frequency disturbance 
on the main system is too high, it increases the risk of 
cascading frequency events because of the unintended tripping 
of RoCoF relays. Without adequate safeguards, this risk is 
increased in low inertia power systems. The RoCoF also 
influences overall deviations in system frequency, which if not 
kept within statutory limits via additional containment and 
restoration response services risks the triggering of under- or 
over-frequency protection on generators or of under-frequency 
load shedding. 
These risks inform operational limits, relating to both 
RoCoF and minimum or maximum frequency excursions that 
the system operator must ensure are respected in the event of a 
credible disturbance. Systems already experiencing 
operational scenarios in which credible loss of infeed (LoIF) 
events within normal security standards gives rise to concern 
include those on the island of Ireland and in GB.  
In a system with decreasing levels of system inertia the 
challenge of complying with RoCoF and frequency limits 
following a credible loss event increases. In this context, this 
paper investigates and discusses different actions to manage 
and contain a credible loss risk in a low inertia GB power 
system. The actions considered in this paper include curtailing 
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 the loss risk, deploying existing frequency response services, 
and deploying additional faster response services. The main 
contributions of this paper are as follows: 
• it is shown that at very low inertia, scheduling more 
reserve holding of comparatively slow dynamic 
containment response services is incapable of containing 
a loss of infeed event within frequency limits;  
• it is also shown that under the current 0.125 Hz/s RoCoF 
limit, present and future frequency containment products, 
as they are defined, are not sufficiently fast acting to 
contain a normal loss of infeed event within the RoCoF 
limit. At present, the only viable options deployed in GB 
are either or both constraining the loss risk or the system 
inertia; and 
• a faster response service is important and there is a need 
for fast acting, and indeed rapidly deliverable, response 
services even at a relaxed RoCoF limit in order to contain 
a loss event within both frequency and RoCoF limits. This 
need is shown to become more dominant as the GB power 
system tend towards lower inertia and the RoCoF limit of 
1 Hz/s. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section II describes 
frequency and RoCoF management in GB; Section III presents 
studies investigating the performance of the services and 
actions employed by the GB Electricity System Operator 
(ESO) via two case studies; Section IV discusses the results of 
the system studies in context; and Section V concludes the 
paper outlining future work. 
II. FREQUENCY AND ROCOF IN GB 
At present, in GB, the frequency response services include 
Primary, Secondary, Enhanced and High frequency responses, 
as shown in Fig. 1, which are deployed to contain a frequency 
event due to a power imbalance as illustrated in Fig. 2. The 
technical definitions of these services are provided in Table I. 
Under European Network of Transmission System Operators 
for Electricity (ENTSO-E) definitions, Primary response is 
roughly equivalent to frequency containment reserve, 
Secondary response is equivalent to restoration reserve and 
reserve dispatch recovery is equivalent to replacement reserve 
[13].  
 
 
Fig. 1: Current GB frequency response services (Image Source: [4]). 
With the exception of Enhanced frequency response (EFR), 
these responses can be dynamic or static. Dynamic frequency 
responses are response services that continuously track 
frequency deviations and provide the required response. Static 
frequency responses are frequency-triggered services that 
discreetly respond to frequency deviations when a given 
frequency threshold is reached.  
 
 
Fig. 2: Illustration of the operation of GB frequency response services (Image 
Source: [14]). 
TABLE I.  OVERVIEW OF FREQUENCY RESPONSE SERVICES [4, 15] 
Service Name Technical Definition 
Primary 
Frequency 
Response  
Full delivery of active power response 10 seconds 
after the event with a 2 second delay and sustained 
for a further 20 seconds. 
Secondary 
Frequency 
Response 
Full delivery of active power response 30 seconds 
after the event and sustained for 30 minutes. 
High Frequency 
Response 
Full delivery of active power response 10 seconds 
after the event with a 2 second delay and sustained 
indefinitely. 
Enhanced 
Frequency 
Response 
Full delivery of response for a 0.5 Hz change in 
frequency and sustained for 15 minutes. This 
service further defines a product with a maximum 
of 500 ms detection and instruction delay, such that 
the response is fully delivered within 1 second. 
 
The ESO must manage frequency excursions within 
frequency limits. These limits are defined by the loss risk 
classifications and a definition of unacceptable frequency 
conditions in the Security and Quality of Supply Standard 
(SQSS), summarised in Table II.  
 
TABLE II.  DEFINITIONS OF LOSS RISK AND FREQUENCY CONDITIONS 
[16] 
Normal Loss 
Risk 
That level of loss of power in-feed risk which is covered 
over long periods operationally by frequency response to 
avoid a deviation of system frequency by more than 0.5 
Hz. Until 31st March 2014, this is 1000 MW. From April 
1st 2014, this is 1320 MW. However as described in [17] 
this loss risk is still currently 1000 MW. 
Infrequent 
Loss Risk 
That level of loss of power in-feed risk which is covered 
over long periods operationally by frequency response to 
avoid a deviation of system frequency outside the range 
49.5 Hz to 50.5 Hz for more than 60 seconds. Until 31st 
March 2014, this is 1320 MW. From April 1st 2014, this 
is 1800 MW. However as described in [17] this loss risk 
is still currently 1320 MW. 
 Unacceptable 
Frequency 
Conditions 
These are conditions where: 
i) the steady state frequency falls outside the statutory 
limits of 49.5 Hz to 50.5 Hz; or 
ii) a transient frequency deviation on the MITS persists 
outside the above statutory limits and does not recover to 
within 49.5 Hz to 50.5 Hz within 60 seconds. 
Transient frequency deviations outside the limits of 49.5 
Hz and 50.5 Hz shall only occur at intervals, which ought 
reasonably be considered as infrequent. It is not possible 
to be prescriptive with regard to the type of secured event 
which could lead to transient deviations since this will 
depend on the extant frequency response characteristics 
of the system which National Grid Electricity 
Transmission shall adjust from time to time to meet the 
security and quality requirements of this Standard. 
 
Non-synchronous generators are increasingly displacing 
synchronous generators in the generation dispatch. Under the 
status quo, the displacement of synchronous generation 
reduces system inertia and increases RoCoF during a power 
imbalance. Furthermore, the displacement results in 
simultaneously reducing the Primary frequency response 
availability in terms of capacity and increasing frequency 
containment response requirement, due to the higher RoCoF 
experienced for a given loss event. Consequently, the 
reduction in system inertia leads to concerns regarding 
containing a frequency event within the acceptable limits both 
in terms of RoCoF and frequency.  
Although the frequency response products do not specify 
any particular technology, conventional providers of dynamic 
frequency response services are synchronous generators. The 
GB ESO is aware of the challenges posed by the changing 
generation mix and has begun steps to improve the frequency 
response market and associated services [18]. In 2016, a one-
off tender for EFR was held and all the contracts to date have 
been awarded to battery storage [19]. The ESO has proposed 
further services including the future dynamic services as 
illustrated in Fig. 3, where both the Dynamic Balancing and 
Dynamic Containment services each have a detection and 
instruction delay of 500 ms, and speed of delivery of 500 ms 
(i.e., each service is capable of fully delivering response 
within 1 second), with a deadband of ±0.1 Hz and ±0.2 Hz 
respectively. The proposed duration of the dynamic 
containment service is 20 minutes, while the duration of 
dynamic balancing service is still to be determined.  
The ESO published [4] highlighting, among other factors, 
the limits to largest loss of demand or generation, which are 
constrained by the system inertia and RoCoF limit. The 
RoCoF limit in GB is ±1 Hz/s for new and existing generators 
with a delay of 500 ms. However, synchronous power stations 
with greater than 5 MW registered capacity commissioned 
between the 1st of August 2014 and 31st of July 2016 are 
permitted a RoCoF setting of ±0.5 Hz/s with a delay of 500 ms 
[20, 21]. This means that a future GB power system is likely 
to experience scenarios where the effective RoCoF limit is 
±0.5 Hz/s. 
 
 
Fig. 3: National Grid’s proposed dynamic response concept (adapted from 
[22]). 
Although the original document gave existing synchronous 
and non-synchronous generators until the 1st July 2016 to 
make the relevant changes, coordinating and implementing 
these changes, particularly in reference to distributed 
generation, has proven challenging. As a result, there are 
about 2 GW of distributed generation that are still using relays 
that could activate if RoCoF exceeds ±0.125 Hz/s [4]. This is 
significant since RoCoF relays are widely used in the UK and 
Ireland, as introduced in Section I. Consequently, due to the 2 
GW of distributed generation still using the ±0.125 Hz/s 
RoCoF setting, ±0.125 Hz/s is currently the practical RoCoF 
limit in the GB power system, leading to a need to manage 
RoCoF within this limit during a frequency event, as discussed 
in [4]. 
III. SYSTEM STUDIES 
Assessment of power system behaviour depends on use of 
detailed engineering models. Many of these are highly 
complex and make wide-ranging exploration of particular 
issues extremely challenging [23]. Thus, it is a well-
established practice within the sector to use a variety of 
simplified models to address particular phenomena; examples 
include, the model used by the GB ESO in [24], and other 
single bus models in [25], [26], [27] and [28]. 
An in-house developed ‘single bus’ model described in [20] 
based on [24] has been used for the studies in this section. 
This model was developed in DigSILENT PowerFactory [29] 
specifically to assess a range of frequency response products 
in contrast to more generic models. It allows the convenient 
representation of different operational conditions, response 
providers and the accurate assessment of system frequency in 
response to different events on the GB transmission system.  
Unless otherwise stated, the studies apply the following 
assumptions: 
• demand is set at 20 GW to illustrate the impact of low 
demand; 
• in the context of this paper, ‘Demand’ refers to demand 
on the transmission system and includes pumping hydro, 
interconnector exports and net unmetered embedded 
generation;  
 • embedded inertia is assumed to be applied as a function of 
total demand with an inertia constant of 1.83 seconds i.e., 
the inertia in GVAs is 1.83 multiplied by demand. This 
method, and the value of the inertia constant, is obtained 
from discussions with industry experts; 
• demand provides an inherent active power response of 
2.5%/Hz [14]; 
• an inertia constant of 6 seconds is assumed for all gas 
units and 4 seconds for all other synchronous generators; 
these values are chosen following discussions with 
industry experts; 
• generation is split into synchronous and non-synchronous 
generation; 
• generation is further divided into flexible and non-
flexible, where flexible generation can provide active 
power response, while non-flexible cannot; 
• background generation is obtained from the ESO’s future 
energy scenarios report under the gone green scenario for 
2025 [21]; 
• in order to meet a given inertia target, generation is 
dispatched in the following order. Baseload power supply 
is first met by nuclear dispatched at 77% of the 
background capacity [30], gas plants are dispatched next 
to deliver the required Primary response until demand has 
been met or the inertia target has been achieved, or 
whichever of the two occurs first. If there is still a 
shortfall of demand it is met by dispatch from the 
remaining generation background but if the inertia target 
has been achieved the remaining demand is met by non-
synchronous dispatch; 
• dynamic Primary response is delivered by flexible 
generation. Flexible generators are 75% loaded with 
response provided by 50% of the headroom [31];  
• where applicable Enhanced response is dispatched at 201 
MW, assuming that all capacity procured in the 2016 EFR 
tender is available [19] and no new capability has been 
procured; 
• containment is attempted for the least containment reserve 
holding, and all response is assumed to be dynamic; and 
• the delivery of responses is at the minimum technical 
requirements of their definitions, however, it is 
recognised that delivery of responses may in practice have 
a shorter delay or in some cases faster ramp rates.  
 
The studies presented in this paper are an extension of the 
work done in [32], with changes made to the modelling 
dispatch and cases for consideration. Most importantly, in 
light of [22] where the ESO provides further clarity on the 
specifications of their future dynamic response services, the 
application of the dynamic containment service has been 
updated to match the current specifications of the service. The 
cases presented below, in Sections III.A and III.B, serve to 
illustrate the impact that curtailing the loss risk or procuring 
faster frequency response services have on the power system’s 
ability to keep frequency and RoCoF within acceptable 
conditions during a normal loss of infeed event.  
A. Case 1: Containing Normal Loss Risk Within ±0.5 Hz of 
Nominal Frequency with a ±0.125 Hz/s RoCoF Limit 
On the 7th of August 2016, the GB power system 
experienced a system inertia of 135 GVAs with a transmission 
system demand of 16.3 GW. Due to the combination of a 
windy weekend with high output from wind and solar, and low 
demand from the 7th to the 8th of August 2016 the ESO had to 
curtail the loss risk in order to keep the power system secured 
[4]. Based on the operational scenario on the 7th of August 
2016, the study scenarios presented in this section are for a 
GB power system with 20 GW of demand and 130 GVAs of 
inertia, while RoCoF and frequency limits are applied under 
current definitions. These scenarios illustrate the performance 
of frequency response services and loss risk curtailment 
actions in the GB power system to manage the current normal 
loss risk. 
To illustrate the impact of loss risk curtailment and faster 
frequency response services on frequency and RoCoF at low 
demand and inertia, the four scenarios that are presented in 
Table III are investigated. Table IV is an overview of the 
observations from the study, with Fig. 4 and 5 showing the 
frequency and RoCoF plots for scenarios A - D.  
TABLE III.  STUDY SCENARIOS FOR CONTAINING NORMAL LOSS RISK 
WITHIN ±0.5 HZ OF NOMINAL FREQUENCY WITH A ±0.125 HZ/S ROCOF LIMIT 
Title  Description 
Scenario A Included as a reference scenario, the simulated loss is 1 
GW with only Primary response available to contain the 
event. 
Scenario B The simulated loss is 1 GW with Primary, Enhanced and 
the new Dynamic Containment frequency response 
services dispatched to contain frequency deviation. 
Scenario C The simulated loss is reduced from 1 GW to 650 MW, with 
only Primary response dispatched to contain the frequency 
deviation. 
Scenario D The simulated loss is 1 GW with Enhanced and the new 
Dynamic Containment frequency response services 
dispatched to contain frequency deviation. 
TABLE IV.  OVERVIEW OF STUDY SCENARIOS AND OBSERVATIONS FOR 
CASE 1 
 A B C D 
Simulated 
Loss 
1 GW 1 GW 650 MW 1 GW 
RoCoF 
Contained 
No No Yes No 
Frequency 
Contained 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Dispatched 
Responses 
Primary 
Primary, 
Enhanced and 
Dynamic 
Containment 
Primary 
Enhanced and 
Dynamic 
Containment 
 
It is demonstrated by Scenario C that curtailing the loss risk 
to manage frequency stability within RoCoF and frequency 
limits is the only viable scenario of the four presented in this 
case study.  
 There are two factors that determine acceptable frequency 
behaviour during a power imbalance: the maximum frequency 
deviation (nadir or zenith) and RoCoF. Consequently, the 
system must be secured against the normal loss risk in terms 
of both these factors. Scenario C simulates a 650 MW loss risk 
because that is the loss risk limit, based on the swing equation 
[7], for a 130 GVAs power system with a ±0.125 Hz/s RoCoF 
limit. Although, in principle, the ESO should accept a loss of 
infeed of up to 1 GW and tolerate a frequency deviation that is 
no bigger than ±0.5 Hz, in this case study the system must be 
dispatched such that no single loss risk exceeds 650 MW. The 
output of any single unit exceeding that level must be curtailed 
so that it does not. An alternative is to re-dispatch the power 
system to increase inertia, since the loss risk limit calculated 
using the swing equation is higher with more inertia for the 
same RoCoF limit.  
It is observed in Fig. 4 that while Scenario A produces a 
frequency behaviour that exceeds acceptable frequency 
conditions for a normal loss risk, Scenario C successfully 
contains the event within frequency conditions due to the 
reduced loss risk, even though both scenarios only deploy 
Primary response.  
 
 
Fig. 4: Frequency plots comparing the impact of different actions to meet 
operational limits for a system with 130 GVAs of inertia. 
 
 
Fig. 5: RoCoF plots comparing the impact of different actions to meet 
operational limits for a system with 130 GVAs of inertia. 
In Scenarios B and D in Fig. 4 and 5, it is shown that while 
the inclusion of faster dynamic frequency response services 
such as Enhanced response and the Dynamic Containment 
concept contains frequency within acceptable conditions, 
RoCoF limits are violated. This is because the service 
definitions for the faster services have no impact on RoCoF, 
particularly in reference to the current limit of ±0.125 Hz/s, 
which typically includes a detection window of 100 ms or less.  
B. Case 2: Containing Normal Loss Risk Within ±0.5 Hz of 
Nominal Frequency and a ±0.5 Hz/s RoCoF Limit 
The previous case study considered containment of a 
normal loss risk based on the 7th of August 2016 operational 
scenario, with a RoCoF limit of ±0.125 Hz/s. However, it is 
conceivable that, in the future, unless the relevant plants are 
decommissioned, or otherwise not in merit, the RoCoF limit in 
the GB power system will be ±0.5 Hz/s. Therefore, the impact 
of faster response services during a credible loss event should 
be assessed for operational scenarios with a ±0.5 Hz/s RoCoF 
limit where the present (1 GW) and future (1.32 GW) normal 
loss risk conditions are considered. According to the swing 
equation, the minimum system inertia values for the cases 
being considered here are 50 GVAs (for the current normal 
loss risk) and 66 GVAs (for the future normal loss risk).  
TABLE V.  STUDY SCENARIOS FOR CONTAINING NORMAL LOSS RISK 
WITHIN ±0.5 HZ OF NOMINAL FREQUENCY WITH A ±0.5 HZ/S ROCOF LIMIT 
Title  Description 
Scenario A Included as a reference scenario with only Primary 
response available to contain the event 
Scenario B Primary and Enhanced frequency response services 
dispatched to contain frequency deviation. 
Scenario C Primary, Enhanced and the Dynamic Containment 
frequency response services dispatched to contain 
frequency deviation. 
Scenario D Enhanced and the new Dynamic Containment frequency 
response services dispatched to contain frequency 
deviation. 
TABLE VI.  OVERVIEW OF STUDY SCENARIOS AND OBSERVATIONS IN 
CASE 2 
 A B C D 
Frequency 
Contained 
No No Yes Yes 
Frequency 
Stable 
No No Yes Yes 
Dispatched 
Responses 
Primary 
Primary and 
Enhanced 
Primary, 
Enhanced 
and 
Dynamic 
Containment 
Enhanced 
and 
Dynamic 
Containment 
 
Four scenarios are presented in Table V for investigation, 
which compare the performance of different frequency 
response actions. An overview of the study scenarios is 
presented in Table VI, and the resultant frequency plots are 
presented in Fig. 6 for a 1 GW normal loss risk, and Fig. 7 for 
a 1.32 GW normal loss risk. A similar trend is observed in 
both Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, indicating that while the addition of 201 
MW of EFR to the already procured Primary response raises 
the frequency nadir in Scenario B when compared to Scenario 
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 A, both scenarios breach the acceptable frequency conditions 
for a normal loss risk. This oscillation observed here, similar 
to that seen in Scenario A of Fig. 4, is attributed to the 
inadequacy of the response service that is insufficiently fast to 
contain the event. However, it is arguable that this behaviour 
could be remedied by modifying the simple proportional 
controller applied in the studies presented in this paper. A 
proportional controller was used here to represent the worst-
case controller behaviour of the providers of the response 
services. 
 
 
Fig. 6: Frequency plots for 1 GW loss at 50 GVAs. 
 
Fig. 7: Frequency plots for 1.32 GW loss at 66 GVAs. 
The inclusion of the Dynamic Containment service in 
Scenario C contains the event and provides a reasonably well 
damped frequency oscillation after containment. That said, 
completely displacing Primary response with the Dynamic 
Containment service shows a more pronounced dampening 
effect in Scenario D.  
It is expected that the trends observed in this case study will 
continue as the inertia in the power system reduces towards 
the minimum inertia for a ±1 Hz/s RoCoF limit and 
corresponding loss risk. It can be said that with a relaxed 
RoCoF limit, the activation delay, and indeed the speed of full 
delivery, of the frequency containment services becomes more 
important for stable containment of frequency within RoCoF 
and frequency limits, since at lower inertia frequency limits 
would be reached sooner than at higher inertia and would need 
to be contained by a sufficiently fast response service. The 
expression presented in the appendix can be used as a rough 
estimation of the turning point(s) of the frequency trend due to 
the action of a given containment service in response to a 
frequency event. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
By considering the results of Section III, the following 
observations are made: 
1) Given the frequency response services currently available 
in GB, at low demand and low inertia, the current 
practical RoCoF limit can only be managed by curtailing 
the loss risk or increasing the inertia in the power system. 
2) Fast response with a 500 ms detection and instruction 
delay such as that proposed by the ESO has no impact on 
the initial RoCoF experienced by the power system 
following a power imbalance. That said, further 
increasing the speed of the response service improves the 
impact on RoCoF, e.g., deploying synthetic inertia 
controllers that have typical response times between 50 
and 200 ms [33]. 
3) Once the GB power system is no longer constrained by 
the ±0.125 Hz/s RoCoF limit, the critical actions will tend 
towards dispatching additional containment reserve above 
the 201 MW of EFR that supports the already existing 
Primary response. At the lower system inertia permitted 
by relaxed RoCoF settings, containing the loss risk 
becomes more of an issue of adequacy of dynamic 
frequency containment services. 
4) As the GB power system tends towards lower inertia, 
frequency containment reserves will increasingly need to 
be met by faster acting services, supplementing traditional 
Primary reserves that are not quick enough alone.  
 
According to the ESO’s report in [34], by 2025/26 the loss 
limit would be 650 MW about 25% of the time in order to 
comply with a practical RoCoF limit of ±0.125 Hz/s. This 
means that BritNed, a 1 GW interconnector, would have to be 
curtailed by 350 MW. A constrained interconnector for 25% 
of the year means that a total of 705.6 GWh of imports over 
BritNed would have been prevented from being used. The 
ESO in [5] puts the cost of curtailing loss risk as a solution to 
the issue of meeting the RoCoF limit of ±0.125 Hz/s at £268m 
per annum by 2020, expected to increase year by year. The 
system operator in Ireland curtails wind to address RoCoF and 
frequency concerns, among other things [27, 35]. However, 
the Irish power system utilises the system non-synchronous 
penetration limit (SNSP) as a metric to guide power system 
operation and keep within statutory limits for credible loss of 
infeed events. Furthermore, steps have been taken in Ireland to 
mitigate the RoCoF and frequency stability risks via system 
services proposed in the Delivering a Secure, Sustainable 
Electricity System (DS3) project [36], which include new 
products such as synchronous inertial response and fast 
frequency response capable of responding within 150 – 300 
ms [37], and reducing the minimum stable generation of 
thermal plants to increase system inertia without having to 
curtail more wind [38].   
Curtailing generation or interconnector imports and exports 
to contain the loss risk already takes place in GB [4]. While it 
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 is currently a viable option, it is projected that in the future the 
costs associated with curtailment will increase, fuelled in part 
by more interconnector capacity [4]. Dispatching more 
deloaded synchronous plants or deploying synchronous 
compensation are potential alternatives that would increase the 
inertia in the power system while providing additional benefits 
such as reactive power and short circuit current, reducing the 
need to curtail the loss risk. In the case of the deployment of 
synchronous compensation, the costs and benefits are being 
considered [39].  
In Case 1 the RoCoF exceeds the current 0.125 Hz/s limit 
for 1 GW loss. A plan is in place in GB to update the RoCoF 
settings, but it is not scheduled to be completed until 2022 
[40]. Acceleration of this programme would reduce the total 
number of hours for which the output of the largest infeed 
would need to be curtailed.  
Lastly, the third and fourth points outlined at the start of this 
section highlight the need for fast acting frequency 
containment services, especially at low demand and inertia. 
Although the probability of the GB power system operating at 
low inertia levels sub 75 GVAs is extremely low before 2025 
[4], such a level of inertia will become more likely as the 
power system tends towards a greater percentage penetration 
of converter connected generation and accompanying closure 
of synchronous plant. Services such as the Dynamic 
Containment frequency response concept are a step in the right 
direction. However, while wind turbines can provide such 
responses –and few conventional synchronous plant will 
normally have been scheduled to be available to provide a 
response service under high wind conditions– the current 
service design and market structure precludes the participation 
of wind farms. This is because the current market structure for 
commercial frequency response is a month-ahead market [41], 
a timescale that is prohibitive for wind plants due to the 
limited predictability of the wind resource beyond a few days 
[42]. Similarly, a persistent response for 20 minutes provides 
challenges for such providers; however, these are not 
insurmountable and can be overcome by strategies such as 
deploying complementary storage or deloading. Aside from 
this there is also the practical challenge, namely: there is 
currently no real distinction between dynamic Primary and 
dynamic Secondary response for generators providing the 
service. This is because, in practice, dynamic Secondary 
response in GB is an extension of dynamic Primary response. 
Plants providing these services will typically perform an 
action during a power imbalance that meets both service 
requirements without further action on the part of the plant 
operator. Furthermore, the procurement of Primary, Secondary 
and High frequency responses as a bundle is a barrier to 
participation for some providers, such as wind plants, in the 
commercial frequency response market. That said, it is worth 
noting that at the time of writing the GB ESO is running trials 
to investigate ways to improve market practices towards 
furthering increased participation [43]. Nonetheless, it is likely 
that an unbundling of future frequency containment and 
restoration services would provide benefits to the power 
system and allow the technologies that are displacing 
synchronous generators participate in frequency response 
services that mitigate the impact of the changing power 
landscape in terms of frequency stability. This will give 
providers the opportunity to participate in either or both 
frequency containment and restoration services depending on 
their capabilities and inclination. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has investigated the impact of credible single 
loss of infeed events in respect of statutory limits on system 
frequency and practical limits on RoCoF. However, it also 
shows that traditional Primary frequency response services are 
unsuitable for adequately managing loss risks as RoCoF 
approaches ±1 Hz/s.  
At the time of writing, the RoCoF limit is the critical 
constraint, and the ESO can ensure frequency stability by 
either curtailing the loss risk or increasing the inertia in the 
power system. However, there are disadvantages associated 
with both options including limiting interconnector imports or 
the uptake of wind and incurring additional significant 
balancing costs. That said, the impact can be minimised by 
reducing the minimum stable generation of thermal plants.  
In a low inertia power system that is no longer constrained 
by the ±0.125 Hz/s RoCoF limit, maintaining acceptable 
frequency conditions would become the dominant constraint. 
However, this paper shows that traditional Primary frequency 
response services are unsuitable for adequately managing loss 
risks as RoCoF approaches ±1 Hz/s. Consequently, managing 
the credible loss risk will be dependent on the deployment of 
fast acting frequency containment services, such as the 
Dynamic Containment response concept.  
The next steps of the work presented in this paper include 
quantifying the impact of the current and future practical 
RoCoF limits in terms of the ‘system non-synchronous 
penetration limit’ (SNSP), i.e., the maximum amount of wind, 
solar and HVDC interconnector imports that the system can 
accept at any one time. Future work by the authors will also 
include investigating the benefits of incorporating virtual 
synchronous machines with fast acting response services and 
their impact to frequency behaviour during a frequency event. 
Furthermore, the structure of future frequency response 
services will be investigated in detail to investigate the 
viability and impact of unbundling the frequency response 
services, to understand how those services will interact to 
contain a loss event within frequency limits.  
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APPENDIX 
A closed form solution to the swing equation following a 
power imbalance while under idealistic conditions still 
provides some useful insights. Here we consider this situation 
with frequency response provided via a simplified droop 
characteristic but with a fixed time delay. Beginning with the 
swing equation 
 
2𝐻
𝜕Δ𝑓
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑅(𝑡) − 𝑃(𝑡) 
 
where 𝐻 is the system inertia constant, Δ𝑓(𝑡) is the 
 frequency deviation from nominal, 𝑡 is time, 𝑅(𝑡) is frequency 
response power, and 𝑃(𝑡) is the lost power infeed which is 
equal to 0 for 𝑡 < 0 and 𝑃𝐿  for 𝑡 ≥ 0. Consider a response 
which is proportional to the frequency but with some delay 𝑙 
and rate of delivery 𝑑 such that 𝑅(𝑡) = −𝑑 × Δ𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑙). This 
problem can be solved exactly. In the region 𝑡 < 0 the 
solution is trivial as all variables are zero. In the region 0 ≤
 𝑡 < 𝑙 the loss has occurred but response has not activated, so 
 
2𝐻
𝜕Δ𝑓
𝜕𝑡
= −𝑃𝐿  
 
and is easily solved, noting that Δ𝑓(0) = 0, to give 
 
Δ𝑓(𝑡) = −
𝑃𝐿
2𝐻
𝑡 . 
 
In the next period from 𝑙 ≤ 𝑡 < 2𝑙, the response has 
activated and 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑑
𝑃𝐿
2𝐻
(𝑡 − 𝑙) yielding 
 
2𝐻
𝜕Δ𝑓
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑑
𝑃𝐿
2𝐻
(𝑡 − 𝑙) − 𝑃𝐿 , 
 
which may also be solved in the same manner imposing the 
constraint that Δ𝑓(𝑡) is continuous at 𝑡 = 𝑙. 
The general solution for (𝑁 − 1)𝑙 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑁𝑙 yields a 
polynomial in 𝑡 of order 𝑁 given by 
 
Δ𝑓(𝑡) =  ∑ [
(−𝑡)𝑛  𝑑𝑛−1𝑃𝐿
𝑛! (2𝐻)𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
+ ∑
((1 − 𝑚)𝑙)𝑛−𝑚  𝑑𝑛−𝑚−1𝑡𝑚𝑃𝐿
(𝑛 − 1)! 𝑚! (2𝐻)𝑛−𝑚
𝑛−1
𝑚=1
]. 
 
This expression enables the definition of all turning points 
of the frequency trace unto time 𝑡 = 𝑁𝑙 for a given 𝑙, 𝑑, 𝐻 and 
𝑃𝐿 . These may then be used to quickly assess frequency 
containment and the stability of the system without the need 
for computationally demanding simulation studies. 
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